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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Agency fiduciary law encompasses the doctrine of corporate
opportunity.

The

fiduciary duties a key employee

owes

corporate employer is an area of law in transformation.

his

In that

transformation, the reasonable expectations of the parties in a
corporate-fiduciary

relationship

are decisive in determining

whether a key employee has breached any fiduciary duty owed his
corporate employer.

If a business opportunity is presented to a

key employee, that employee
himself if:

cannot seize the opportunity for

(a) the corporation is financially able to undertake

it; (b) it is within the corporation's line of business, or (c)
the corporation is interested in the opportunity.
In this case, Williams and Rockwood were key employees of
Gillham.
which

While working for Gillham, they took preparatory steps

culminated

advertising
seizing

in exploiting

account

with

KSL.

Gillham's

10-year,

Those preparatory

lucrative
steps and

the KSL account were in breach of Williams' and Rock-

wood's duties to Gillham of

(1) good faith, loyalty, and fair

dealing; (2) to disclose information relevant to the KSL account
entrusted to Williams and Rockwood; and (3) not to put themselves
in a position antagonistic to Gillham concerning the KSL account.
The

issue

employees"
court

of

whether

or merely

Williams

and

Rockwood

"ordinary employees" precluded

were

"key

the trial

from granting summary judgment in favor of Williams and

Rockwood.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER DEVELOPING CASE LAW, WILLIAMS AND ROCKWOOD, AS
KEY EMPLOYEES, BREACHED THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO
GILLHAM.
The
employer

fiduciary

duties a key employee

is a developing area of law.

owes his

corporate

A few exceptional cases

have recognized the competing interests of the corporation, the
individuals, and

society that arise when key employees pursue

business opportunities that the corporation claims belong to it.
Those cases, and scholarly analysis of them, provide a framework
for determining

in this case whether Williams and Rockwood, as

key employees, breached their fiduciary duties to Gillham.
In Competing

Interests

in The Corporate Opportunity Doc-

trine, 67 N. Carolina L. Rev. 435 (1989), Pat K. Chew, Assistant
Professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, argues
that

the corporate opportunity doctrine should acknowledge and

protect legitimate individual and societal interests, as well as
legitimate corporate interests.
that

Second, Professor Chew argues

corporate opportunity disputes should be resolved
2

in ways

that are consistent with the reasonable expectations of both the
corporation and the fiduciaries.

67 N. Carolina L. Rev. at p.

439.
Professor Chew conducted a comprehensive review of corporate
opportunity

cases reported between April

1977 and April 1988.

Her analysis revealed that these disputes usually occur in close
corporations in a wide range of industries.
. The defendants are traditional corporate
fiduciaries such as directors and officers, or, as is
occurring more frequently, the defendants are nontraditional fiduciaries such as key employees.
The
o p p o r t u n i t i e s these individuals pursue are often
directly competitive to the corporation . . . .
Ibid., pp. 436-437, fn. 2.
Professor

Chew offers a solution

that accommodates both

legitimate corporate and non-corporate interests.

She proposes*

that future disputes be resolved according to the expectations of
both

the

corporation

and

the

fiduciaries.

In the

optimal

situation, the parties will have an express agreement on how they
expect to resolve corporate opportunity disputes.

In the absence

of an agreement, the courts should determine what their reasonable expectations would have been.
Professor
maintaining
fiduciaries
economic

the
and

harm

opportunity.

Chew

identifies

integrity

of

Ibid., p. 436.
two corporate

interests:

the relationship

the corporation, and

between

(1)
the

(2) avoiding the direct

incurred when the corporation is deprived of an
Ibid., p. 441.

Professor

Chew recognizes

the necessity

to maintain the

integrity of the fiduciary-corporate relationship:
3

Corporate fiduciaries are in positions of trust.
In order to fulfill their general responsibilities and
make key decisions, they must have access to extensive
and confidential information.
They also have significant decision making authority to direct and implement
major corporate policies.
As representatives of the
corporation, they are in contact with individuals and
e n t i t i e s , including suppliers, distributors, and
customers, that serve the corporations 1 operational
needs.
Because of their corporate positions and
activities, fiduciaries are exposed to opportunities of
interest to the corporation and of possible personal
interest to themselves.
The corporation relies on fiduciaries to fulfill
their duties in good faith and with integrity.
The
corporation provides them with access to information
and contacts so that the fiduciaries can perform
e f f e c t i v e l y , not so that they can exploit these
resources for their own personal benefit.
Although
individuals assume fiduciary roles to serve their
personal and professional objectives as well as the
corporation's needs, the corporation is concerned that
these personal interests may conflict with corporate
interests—that fiduciaries will allow their personal
interests to overcome their corporate loyalty and will
betray the corporation's trust.
The corporation does
not want to have to speculate about or monitor the
f i d u c i a r i e s ' honesty and fair-dealing.
It wants
assurance that when the fiduciaries make corporate
decisions, those decisions are not tainted by personal
interests.
Ibid., p. 442.

She characterizes the typical fact pattern:

In the typical fact pattern the fiduciaries
identify, investigate, negotiate, decide to pursue, and
make preliminary plans for the opportunity. They then
resign their fiduciary roles, actively begin a competing business, and ultimately develop the opportunity
into a profitable venture.
The fiduciaries usually
have not signed non-competition agreements.
Ibid . , p.

444.

(Footnote

omitted.)

She

acknowledges

the

negative consequences fiduciaries have suffered as the result of
taking

only

preparatory

steps while

corporation:

4

still

employed

by

the

Moreover
'jarts nave
assumed implicitly that
fiduciaries ••-.-/ haive breached their duty even though
only preparatory steps to start the business were taken
d u r i n g the fiduciaries' tenure,, it those preparatory
steps culminate
exploitation at the opportunity.
[ Energy Resources Corp. v. Porter , 14 Mass . App . C t .
296," 4 38 N.E. 2d 391 (1982); Klinicki v. LundgrVn, 298
Or. 662, 695 P. 2d 906 . l.-#55) (en banc;; Nicholson v.
E v a n s , 642 P. 2d 727 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) . ;
Prohibiting the
fiduciaries' active competition against the corporation
during their tenure is consistent with basic principles
of the duty of loyalty.
r H . Henn & ". Alexander, Laws
of C o r p o r a t i o n s , 628 . 3<i ed.. 1983
The corporate
opportunity doctrine, however, also ••;,:•: .,-ges upon the
f i d u c i a r i e s 1 preparing to compete, making inquiries,
and g a t h e r i n g information.
These activities may be
tainted by the fiduciaries' ultimate action of starting
a. competing business
av-i thus t;>- ioctrir.e exercises a
• h I.1.1 i na effect o n t h em .
Ibid
Ies

t^ne

individuals1

legitimate

rights
..<=• ; iduc iary-cc rporat e r~ ia t lonsnip is more
;r.ai:gcus t: an agency
o i o y e e , or p a r t n e r s h i p
relationship in which both p i t i e s have recognized the
juries and rights of tne other and such rights and
duties are flexibly negotiated
When the corporation
and the fiduciaries enter into their relationship, they
are concerned about protecting the;:1 :wn interests o :**
acknowledge the existence and importance of the other
party's interests,
'-^-; ther party can afford to underestimate the other i ;argaining position.
Individuals
*v o are being considered for director; officer, or key
employee positions possess attributes such as experi-•V :e
talents, or economic resources chat are higniy
:\-,i*ueo oy the corporation,
viese individuals also are
likely to have other options in wnich to invest their
>ou;:es or t a l e n t s .
The corporation likewise has
- tributes such as institutional resources and status
that are attractive T * prospective •' id u " inr ; *>• •
ik.4^ •
increasing

**7-44o.
number

vc^aorp
o.

opportunity doctrine;

omittea )

She recognizer
- ' tu

cne

th*a*" en

corporate

To begin, the number of situations implicating the
corporate opportunity doctrine is increasing.
Businesses are becoming more diversified and, consequently,
the opportunities in which they may have some interest,
expectancy, or capability are increasing.
Meanwhile,
fiduciaries are becoming increasingly well educated;
they are multifaceted individuals who are exposed to
and interested in diverse ideas and opportunities. The
proliferation of professional meetings, journals for
every conceivable professional specialty, and telec o m m u n i c a t i o n systems allowing an extensive and
instantaneous horizon of contacts and ideas enhance
innovative thinking and the generation of entrepreneurial ideas.
Finally, the fast pace of technological
development and the increasing concern with industrial
productivity provide fertile ground for more opportunities.
(V)arious courts have found key employees
[See Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp.,
425 A.2d 957 (Del. 1980); Wilmington Trust Co. v.
Consistent Asset Management Co., No. 8867 (Del. Ch.
March 25, 1987) (LEXIS, States Library, Omni file);
Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d
564 (1978)] and majority shareholders subject to the
doctrine.
Several cases decided in Georgia illustrate
the difficulty of these issues. In determining whether
a chief engineer was subject to the state's business
opportunity statute, the supreme court concluded that
the law was applicable to directors and officers but
not to "typical employees." It implied, however, that
individuals other than directors and officers might be
subject to the law if they were in fiduciary positions.
The court did not e l a b o r a t e on what constituted
fiduciary status.
A later Georgia case held that the
statute should be read literally to apply only to
directors and officers.
The holding, however, was
expansive in its application.
A vice-president of
sales, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, was
presumed to be an "officer" and hence subject to the
statute.
Ibid . , pp.

449-450.

(Footnotes

omitted.)

She

points

out

problems that will arise as the corporate opportunity doctrine is
extended to nontraditional fiduciaries:
The extension of the corporate opportunity
doctrine to nontraditional fiduciaries raises several
issues. First, courts are more likely to conclude that
key employees are subject to the doctrine and its
6

resrr;::.:;:.:; \ tose employees hav-> Dee. endowed wi*~h
more trust and responsibility (as sugge^'ed by access
to c o n f i d e n t i a l information and increased authority"!
and have invested significantly in the corporation -as
suggested by thriv years with the corporation and an
equity interest).
Given this judicial propensity and a
d e s i r e to avoid r e s t r i c t i o n s on their a c t i v i t i e s .
e m p l o y e e s may be hesitant
accept more trustworthy
p o s i t i o n s or to increase their corporate commitment.
This result seems contrary to policy interests, which
would be better served ; f Individuals were rewarded
rather than penalized for their •.••creasing ccrpcr-. "e
r .") 1 es and resocns i b i 1 i +"": ° ^
Second
-: e e v o iv ing
d i s t i n c t i o n oetweei:
^-x
employees who are considered fiduciaries and those who
are not creates uncertainty for Individuals with major
corporate responsibilities.
Many o: these individuals
are no doubt unaware that they may be subject to the
corporate opportunity doctrine.
"J;^J lack of notice _s
especially significant because or the disparity between
the standard of conduct for nonf iduciaries and the
standard for fiduciaries.
In iignt of the potential
consequences for key employees, corporations arguably
should nave a duty to it. term those employees when the
corporation considers them to be fiduciaries subject to
the corporate opportunity doctrine.
Ibid .

n . .* ..

;

? r o f e - s .:• r

Cbe

11ni.i t f"ed
emphasizes

••;*:• — :••••
tunities

as
anu

the development

the

f

V?

importance

S'rcessf'ii

^ . e.. ;•

ot

•.

development

of

- .

i- l.i 1
oppor-

• --^rn'Rs.

T r a d i_t i cna 1 T e s t s
V

: K- ^

e m p l Dyed

by

citations ^;
; :; summarized

- -!'*:*---r
*. ~

c

-../,,

* id'K n r i e ^

^

fc

a ,

f

p<.ts

have

~ecrH

:

-a

a- 'f'lries

snouui e-e

-s

the ructrlnal confusion m a t

tta:

, na

analysis

>-»e discusses
appears

... x ^ w ^ u ^ a

^^c*i:

S o m e ......
-.
I s a r l v . * rugcling with the
i n a d e q u a c i e s - • the traditional tests.
Some cases
r e f l e c t an ambiv * I en t. s o m e t i m e s incomprehensi b i e
approach *
^m:---:
^-^rtunity problems. The courts

7

TABLE 1
TRADITIONAL TESTS:
CORPORATE INTEREST AS EXCLUSIVE CONCERN

Test

Key Inquiries

Consequences

Line of
Business Test

Is the opportunity in competition with corporation?
Is the opportunity one to
which the corporation
could possible adapt its
resources?

If yes, the fiduciaries are precluded
from pursuing the
opportunity.

Expectancy
Test

Does the corporation have
a contractual claim to the
opportunity?

If yes, the fiduciaries are precluded
from pursuing the
opportunity.

Fairness Test

Would it be unfair to the
corporation for the fiduciaries to pursue the
opportunity?

If yes, the fiduciaries are precluded
from pursuing the
opportunity.

Miller Test

Is the opportunity in the
corporation's line of
business? If so, would
it be unfair to the corporation for the fiduciaries to pursue the opportunity? (Combination of
line of business test and
fairness test.)

If both in the line
of business and unfair, the fiduciaries are precluded
from the opportunity.

8

cite traditional tests in an almost perfunctory way,
but the test on which they actually rely is sometimes
unrecognizable as the traditional tests cited. Because
the traditional tests and the eventual results are not
consistent, these courts often cannot provide logical,
well-reasoned explanations for the results.
They
instead follow the routine of elaborately stating the
facts, citing the tests, and announcing their conclusion. Unfortunately, the analytical step of explaining
how the legal principles are applied to the facts to
reach the indicated legal conclusion often is missing.
Ibid., pp. 465-466.

(Footnotes omitted.)

Emerging Corporate Opportunity Models
Professor Chew identifies three emerging models:

(2) the

corporate capability model, (2) the corporate expectations model,
and

(3) the disclosure model.

Table 2 on the following page.

Those models are summarized

in

Each model is reviewed in detail

for its strengths and weaknesses.

Professor Chew notes:

. While the models have noteworthy benefits,
they all have one fundamental shortcoming. The models
focus exclusively on protecting the interests of the
corporation; they do not acknowledge competing societal
and individual interests.
Ibid., p. 469.

(Footnote omitted.)

The Reasonable Expectations Test
Finally, Professor
traditional tests:

Chew explores an alternative

the reasonable expectations test.

to the

Under this

alternative, courts would resolve corporate opportunity disputes
according

to the expectations of the parties, as depicted in

Table 3.

This approach i s in c o n t r a s t to the t r a d i t i o n a l
a p p r o a c h , which b a s e s l i a b i l i t y on t h e defendants 1
f i d u c i a r y s t a t u s and the p r o t e c t i o n of the corporate
interest.
This p r o p o s a l a l s o d i f f e r s from o t h e r
e x p e c t a t i o n - r e l a t e d approaches.
Those a p p r o a c h e s
misconstrue the c o r p o r a t e - f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p and
9

TABLE 2
EMERGING CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY MODELS

Model

Key Inquiries

Consequences

Corporate
Capability
Model

Was the corporation able
(financially, legally,
practically) to pursue
the opportunity?

If not, then the fiduciaries probably would
not be precluded from
the opportunity.

Corporate
Expectations Model

Is the opportunity within the corporation's
reasonable expectations?

If so, then the fiduciaries are precluded
from the opportunity.

Disclosure
Model

Did the fiduciaries disclose the opportunity
and the corporation
consent to the fiduciaries 1 taking of it?

If not, then the fiduciaries are precluded
from the opportunity.

10

TABLE 3
PARTIES1 REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS

Follow
Expectations of
Corporation
Corporation is likely
to negotiate terms
that protect the
integrity of the
corporate-fiduciary
relationship and its
competitive position.

Expectations of
Fiduciaries
Fiduciaries are likely
to negotiate terms
that protect their
rights to compete
and to start new
businesses.

Determination of Specific Expectations
1.
2.
3.

Context of overall relationship.
Principles in Maryland Metals.
Express agreement•

11

Fiduciaries'
interests
coincide with
societal
interests in
promoting competition and
entrepreneurship .

how corporations operate.
Furthermore, they consider
the corporations interest predominant.
Ibid. , pp. 491-492.

She urges courts to begin with an under-

standing of the basic relationships between the corporation and
fiduciaries.
• . . The corporate-fiduciary relationship is more
a n a l o g o u s to an agency, employee, or partnership
relationship where the duties and rights of both
parties are recognized and flexibly negotiated.
The
courts should respect their understanding.
Ibid., P. 493.

(Footnote omitted.)

Developing Case Law
Professor

Chew

refers

to

Science

Accessories

Corp.

v.

Summagraphics, 425 A.2d 957

(Del. 1980), as one of the excep-

tional

took

cases where a court

the bold step of explicitly

recognizing competing corporate and non-corporate interests in a
corporate opportunity dispute.
In Science Accessories, the Delaware Supreme Court analyzed
whether

three employees had breached their fiduciary duties to

their corporate employer.
in

charge

of

departments.

the

research

the

diverting
formed.

and

development

and

engineering

One was chief engineer, and the third was super-

visor of manufacturing.
tors at

One employee was a nuclear physicist

None were corporate officers or direc-

time of the alleged

a technological

wrongdoing, which

involved

concept to the new corporation they

The Delaware court pointed out the duties a key mana-

gerial employee owes his corporate employer:
It is t r u e , of course, that under elemental
principles of agency law, an agent owes his principal a
duty of good faith, loyalty and fair dealing.
3 CJS
12

Agency § 271; Restatement (Second of Agency, § 387
(1957).
Encompassed within such general duties of an
agent is a duty to disclose information that is
relevant to the affairs of the agency entrusted to him.
There is also a corollary duty of an agent not to put
himself in a position antagonistic to his principal
concerning the subject matter of his agency. Restatement (Second of Agency §§ 381 and 393 (1957).
However, agency law is not without its limitations
as to both duty to disclose and duty not to act
adversely to a principal's business. Thus, an agent is
not under a duty to disclose to his principal information obtained in confidence, the disclosure of which
would be a breach of duty to a third person. Restatement Second) of Agency § 381, Comment e (1957); see
also § 393, Comment c (1957).
Similarly, while an agent may not put himself in a
position antagonistic to his principal, an agent is not
thereby prevented from acting in good faith outside his
employment even though it may adversely affect his
principal's business.
Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 387, Comment b (1957).
Further, an agent can make
arrangements or plans to go into competition with his
principal before terminating his agency, provided no
unfair acts are committed or injury done his principal.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 303, Comment e (1957).
A.2d at p. 962.
The court identified the competing policy interests:
These principles and limitations of agency law
carry over into the field of corporate employment so as
to apply not only to officers and directors but also to
key managerial personnel.
See Cahall v. Lofland,
Del.Ch., 114 A. 224 (1921); 3 Fletcher, Cyclopedia
C o r p o r a t i o n s (Perm.Ed.1975) § 846.
They reflect
competing policy interests in the law as to employeremployee relationships. On the one hand there is ff. .
. concern for the integrity of the employment relationship [which] has led courts to establish a rule that
demands of a corporate officer or employee an undivided
and unselfish loyalty to the corporation."
Maryland
Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, Md.App., 382 A.2d 568 (1978),
citing Guth v. Loft, Inc. , Del.Supr., 5 A.2d 503
(1939).
However, there is an off-setting policy
"recognized by the courts . . .
of safeguarding
society's interest in fostering free and vigorous
competition in the economics sphere . . . This policy
in favor of free competition has prompted the recogni13

tion of a privilege in favor of employees which enables
them to prepare or make arrangements to compete with
their employers prior to leaving the employ of their
prospective rivals without fear of incurring liability
for breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty. "
Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, supra, at 569.
The doctrine of corporate opportunity represents
one aspect of the law's effort to reconcile these
competing policy interests. Guth v.^Loft, Inc./ supra.
3 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (Perm.Ed.1975)
§ 861.1.
See General Automotive Manufacturing Company
v. S i n g e r , Wis.Supr., 120 N.W.2d 659, 663 (1963)
stating, "The doctrine of corporate opportunity is a
species of the duty of a fiduciary to act with undivided loyalty." Thus, the law of corporate opportunity
is clearly pertinent, if not decisive, to the issue of
whether defendants breached any fiduciary duty owed SAC
in their handling of the magwire digitizer concept
while in SAC's employ. And SAC so argued below.
Ibid., pp. 962-963.
The court
employee's

summarized

fiduciary

duty

the

law regarding a key manageri

to his corporate

employer

when

business opportunity is presented:
Briefly summarized, the law is that if a business
opportunity is presented to a corporate executive, the
officer cannot seize the opportunity for himself if:
(a) the corporation is financially able to undertake
it; (b) it is within the corporation's line of business; (c) the corporation is interested in the opportunity.
Guth v. Loft, Inc., supra, and Johnston v.
Greene, Del.Supr., 121 A.2d 919 (1956).
However, as
stated in Eguity Corporation v. Milton, Del. Supr.,
221, A.2d 494 at 497 (1966):
A corollary of the Guth rule is that when a
business opportunity comes to a corporate
officer, which, because of the nature of the
opportunity, is not one which is essential or
desirable for his corporation to embrace,
being an opportunity in which it has no
actual or expectant interest, the officer is
entitled to treat the business opportunity as
his own and the corporation has no interest
in it, provided the officer has not wrongfully embarked the corporation's resources in
order to acquire the business opportunity.
14

Ibid., p. 963.
The
finding

Delaware
that

opportunity

Supreme

the concept

Court

affirmed

the

trial

in Science Accessories

court's

was not

an

available to the corporate employer, which was in

poor financial condition.

That ended the -inquiry.

The question then becomes whether the Court's
finding that Brenner's concept was not a corporate
opportunity available to SAC ends the inquiry as to
whether defendants fulfilled their fiduciary duty to
SAC of disclosure and not to divert an opportunity to
themselves. We think so, for this reason. The gist of
SAC's claim that defendants had breached their fiduciary duty to SAC was that the breach occurred as a
result of the defendants' acts of secreting and then
diverting Brenner's magwire concept from SAC to
themselves.
That raised a clear corporate opportunity
issue which the Trial Court found to be the dominant
issue before it at time of trial.
With that issue
having been resolved by the Court against SAC based on
express fin-dings of fact that are not directly contested, SAC cannot now persuasively argue that the
Trial Court's findings as to corporate opportunity are
not also d i s p o s i t i v e of the question of whether
defendants breached their above-mentioned fiduciary
duties to SAC.
For the law of corporate opportunity
sets the parameters of permissible employee conduct
consistent with an employee's fiduciary duties to his
employers of loyalty and fair dealing.
Ibid., pp. 963-964.

(Footnote omitted.)

The court observed:

Thus, the doctrine of corporate opportunity is but
application of agency fiduciary law in a particular
corporate fact setting.
Ibid., p. 964.
The Delaware

Court did analyze the employees' conduct in

light of the corporate employer's failure to prove their conduct
caused

it

to suffer

any

actual

damages.

The

court

quoted

language from Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564 (Md.
App. 1978):
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The right to make arrangements to compete is by no
means absolute and the exercise of the privilege may,
in appropriate circumstances, rise to the level of a
breach of an employee's fiduciary duty of loyalty.
. . . (T)he ultimate determination of whether an
employee has breached his fiduciary duties to his
employer by preparing to engage in a competing enterprise must be grounded upon a thoroughgoing examination
of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
382 A.2d at 569, 570.
Ibid., p. 965.
DISCUSSION
This

case follows the typical

identifies.
negotiated,
pursue

fact pattern Professor Chew

Williams and Rockwood
decided

identified,

investigated,

to pursue, and made preliminary plans to

the KSL opportunity.

They were discovered and fired.

They then actively began their competing business and developed
the KSL account into a profitable venture.

Williams and Rockwood

had not signed any non-competition agreement with Gillham.
Williams and Rockwood occupied positions of trust and met
the criteria

by which Professor Chew identifies a fiduciary.

Williams and Rockwood assert they were merely "employees at will"
and

"although each were given

'Vice-President' titles, neither

were ever corporate officers."
Whether Williams and Rockwood were key employees or ordinary
employees was a factual

issue before

precluded summary judgment.
essential

to determine

the trial

court

which

Resolution of that factual issue was

the duties Williams and Rockwood owed

their corporate employer, Gillham.

If key employees, they owed

Gillham (1) a duty of good faith, loyalty, and fair dealing; (2)
16

a duty

to disclose information relevant to the affairs of the

agency entrusted to them; and (3) a duty not to put themselves in
a position antagonistic to the affairs of the agency entrusted to
them.

If ordinary employees, their duty was only to render loyal

and conscientious service
Williams

during regularly scheduled hours.

and Rockwood

clearly diverted the lucrative KSL

account to their new corporation.

[Brief of Appellant, Contro-

verted Fact No. 2; Gillham Pacts #23, #66, #71, #77, #78; pp. 8,
19, 20, 21-22.]

The KSL account was clearly an affair of the

agency entrusted to them.
Their chief defense is that they developed their plan "on
their own time."

[Brief of the Respondents, p. 3.]

Secondly,

they argue that adapting Gillham forms to their own use did not
constitute misuse of "Gillham business information."
21, R. 109-110.]

[R. 083, <|f

Williams and Rockwood conveniently gloss over

these facts:
1.
were

Five of their corporation's six full-time employees

former

necessary
Appellant,

Gillham

to service

employees
Gillham's

(presumably with knowledge
KSL account).

[Brief of

Controverted Fact No. 2, Gillham Fact #78, p.

21.]
2.

Prior to their termination, they prepared a budget

(presumably derived from Gillham financial information) to
submit to KSL for their new advertising agency take-over of
the KSL account [#49, p. 16].
3.

Prior to their termination, they held a number of
17

closed-door

meetings

(presumably to plan the business of

their new advertising agency's business with KSL and others\
in Williams' office [#43, p. 14].
4.

Prior

to their

termination,

Gillham employees the possibility

of

they explored with

working for their new

corporation [#36, p. 11; #40, p.l2].
The

particular

information

and

employees

necessary

to

service the KSL account was certainly "Gillham business information" which Williams and Rockwood had an affirmative agency duty
not to misuse to Gillham 1 s detriment.
not

argue

that

Gillham

was

not

Williams and Rockwood do

injured

by the loss of

the

$200,000 KSL account.
KSL had been Gillham's client for 10 or 12 years [R. 179, <lfs
10-11 j.

Williams

themselves.

and Rockwood had no right to seize KSL for

Gillham was

financially able to service the KSL

account; there was no evidence to the contrary.

The KSL account

was certainly within Gillham's line of business.

Gillham was

undisputedly interested in continuing to service the KSL account.
Williams' and Rockwood's conduct in seizing the KSL account
was

clearly

not within the parameters of permissible

employee

conduct consistent with their fiduciary duties as key employees.
While key employees at Gillham, they breached their duty of good
faith,

loyalty, and

fair dealing

to Gillham.

They did not

disclose to Gillham KSL's willingness to go with any new agency
they might form.

They put themselves in a position antagonistic

to KSL continuing as a Gillham account.
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Genuine

issues of material

fact precluded

the trial court

from granting summary judgment in favor of Williams and Rockwood,
particularly the issue of whether Williams and Rockwood were "key
employees'1

or merely

"ordinary employees."

This Court should

reverse the trial court's award of summary judgment and the award
of judgment and costs that followed thereupon.
POINT II
USE OF GILLHAM'S KSL BUSINESS INFORMATION AGAINST
GILLHAM IN VIOLATION OF THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTIES AS KEY
EMPLOYEES PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
WILLIAMS AND ROCKWOOD.
Williams

and Rockwood argue that because Gillham did not

file affidavits in response to their Motion for Summary Judgment,
the trial court's award of summary judgment was proper.
and Rockwood

misconstrue

Rule

56 of

Williams

the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure.
Rule 56(e) provides, in pertinent part:
. The court may permit affidavits to be
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion
for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.
Gillham's
facts

and

set

controversy.

response
forth

[R. 176-197]

specific

identified

supplemental

Those supplemental

facts

controverted
supporting

facts were all supported by

reference to the depositions which had been taken in the matter.
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Gillham's
56(e).

The

response was

supplemental

clearly

facts

in accordance with

clearly

supported

Rule

Gillham's

contention that Williams and Rockwood, as key employees, breached
their

fiduciary duties to Gillham.

See also, , Christensen ex

rel. Christensen v. Financial Serv. Co., 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d
1010 (1963); and Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982).
Misuse of Gillham Business Information
Williams and Rockwood argue that adapting Gillham forms to
their

own use did not

information."

constitute misuse of "Gillham

[R. 083, 1 21, R. 109-110.]

business

Williams and Rockwood

take a shallow view of the "Gillham business information" they
diverted

to their own corporation.

As demonstrated

in Point I

above, five of their corporation's six full-time employees were
former Gillham employees, presumably with knowledge necessary to
service Gillham's KSL account.

The budget they submitted to KSL

for their takeover of the KSL account had to have been derived
from

Gillham

financial

information.

They held

closed-door meetings in Williams' office

a number

of

(on Gillham premises,

presumably during regular business hours and presumably to plan
their new agency's business with KSL and others).

They explored

with Gillham employees the possibility of working for their new
corporation.
The details of the KSL account cannot be said to have been
generally known or available.

As trusted employees, Williams and

rockwood knew those details, however, and used those details to
seize the KSL account from Gillham in breach of their fiduciary
20

duties regarding their business conduct in the use of the Gillham
business

and

conducting

themselves

in a manner

to

benefit

themselves individually and the business entity of Williams and
Rockwood.

[R. 006, <ff 20.]

They used

"Gillham

business information"

against Gillham and to benefit themselves.

antagonistically

The information they

used was more than forms, and they know it.
Summary
granted.

judgment

was not appropriate

and was improperly

This Court should reverse the trial court's award.
CONCLUSION

The genuine issue of whether Williams and Rockwood were "key
employees"

or merely

"ordinary

judgment in this case.

of

(1) good

information

entrusted

to them; and

While

were forming.

relevant

of

the

agency

of the agency entrusted to them.

to divert the KSL account to the new agency they
The KSL account was a business opportunity they

the KSL account.
of

to the affairs

(2) to

at Gillham, Williams and Rockwood clearly made

had no right to seize.

line

their fiduciary duties to

(3) not to put themselves in a position

to the affairs

employed

preparations

breached

faith, loyalty, and fair dealing;

disclose

antagonistic

summary

If "key employees," under developing case

law Williams and Rockwood
Gillham

employees" precluded

Gillham was financially able to service

The KSL account was clearly within Gillham1s

business.

Gillham

was undisputedly

interested

in

continuing to service the KSL account.
Summary judgment was inappropriate and improperly granted.
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Williams and Rockwood misused more Gillham information than mere
forms.

This Court

should

reverse and remand this matter for

trial.
DATED:

June 28, 1989

^Vv—^A/0
Milo S. /Ma/rsden, Jr
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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